McTaggart's problem is that there is an apparent inconsistency in attributing to an event the incompatible properties of past, present and future. The inconsistency is removed by relativising the tensed properties to times: e is present at t, past at t', etc., but only at the cost of making the truth conditions of tensed utterances tenseless, and hence denying the passage of time. Bigelow proposes to deal with McTaggart's contradiction by relativizing tensed properties, not to times, but to possible worlds. By appealing to possible worlds he also hopes to demonstrate that B-relations can be derived from A-properties and temporal passage rather than the other way around. This latter point is repeatedly emphasized as a few passages make plain:
In his celebrated argument, McTaggart claimed that time is unreal because it involves temporal passage -the movement of the Now along a series of moments and events -and temporal passage is contradictory ( [4] , [5] ). Detensers such as Robin Le Poidevin [2] , D. H. Mellor [6] , and myself ( [7] , [8] ) find McTaggart's argument against temporal passage convincing, but they reject his conclusion that time is unreal. According to these philosophers, an ontology that recognizes temporal or B-relations (i.e. earlier than, later than and simultaneity) is sufficient to account for the reality that underlies our vague talk of the passage of time. Tensers such as J. R. Lucas [3] , George Schlesinger [10] , and Quentin Smith [11] , believe that the tenseless view leaves out what is essential to our experience and the reality of time.
In a recent essay, John Bigelow [1] attempts to defend the tensed theory of time by arguing that McTaggart's paradox can be avoided without resorting to what he considers the barren solution of eliminating A-characteristics (i.e. pastness, presentness and futurity) in favour of B-relations. McTaggart's problem is that there is an apparent inconsistency in attributing to an event the incompatible properties of past, present and future. The inconsistency is removed by relativising the tensed properties to times: e is present at t, past at t', etc., but only at the cost of making the truth conditions of tensed utterances tenseless, and hence denying the passage of time. Bigelow proposes to deal with McTaggart's contradiction by relativizing tensed properties, not to times, but to possible worlds. By appealing to possible worlds he also hopes to demonstrate that B-relations can be derived from A-properties and temporal passage rather than the other way around. This latter point is repeatedly emphasized as a few passages make plain:
[W]hat, we may ask, makes the earlier/later relation a distinctively temporal ordering? It is precisely the passage of time which is required to make the earlier/later relation a temporal one. In other words, in order for the earlier/later relation to be a temporal relation it must be defined in such a way as to ensure that when what is earlier is present then what is later is still future, and when what is later is present then what is earlier will be past -that is, the earlier/later relation is a temporal one only if it concerns something which passes. ... this entails that earlier and later must be analyzed in terms of the passage of time, not the other way around. And therefore, the passage of time, in turn must be analyzed and shown to be consistent, without presup- 
